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Abstract. We investigate here concept learning from incomplete examples. Our first purpose is to
discuss to what extent logical learning settings have to be modified in order to cope with data
incompleteness.  More precisely we are interested in extending the learning from interpretations
setting introduced by L. De Raedt that extends to relational representations the classical propositional
(or attribute-value) concept learning from examples framework. We are inspired here by ideas
presented by H. Hirsh in a work extending the Version space inductive paradigm to incomplete data.
H. Hirsh proposes to slightly modify the notion of solution when dealing with incomplete examples: a
solution has to be a hypothesis compatible with all pieces of information concerning the examples. We
identify two main classes of incompleteness. First, uncertainty deals with our state of knowledge
concerning an example. Second, generalization (or abstraction) deals with what part of the description
of the example is sufficient for the learning purpose. These two main sources of incompleteness can be
mixed up when only part of the useful information is known. We discuss a general learning setting,
referred to as "learning from possibilities" that formalizes these ideas, then we present a more specific
learning setting, referred to as "assumption-based learning" that cope with examples which uncertainty
can be reduced when considering contextual information outside of the proper description of the
examples. Assumption-based learning is illustrated on a recent work concerning the prediction of a
consensus secondary structure common to a set of RNA sequences.
1 Introduction
This work finds its origins in a molecular biology problem: the search for a secondary
substructure found on most molecules of a set of RNA sequences. In this problem the data
presented an extreme form of incompleteness: the structural information about the sequences
is ambiguous as for each sequence many structures could be the real one. A framework
addressing such a situation has been presented in [Bouthinon and Soldano, 1998]. This first
work led us to a more general investigation of incompleteness of examples in concept
learning frameworks, and more precisely, we investigate here the effect of incompleteness on
the logical settings for concept learning.  We do not propose any concept learning algorithm,
however we address various theoretical and practical issues concerning such algorithms.
Usually concept learning from examples relies on a membership relation between hypotheses
and examples denoted as cover and such that to be a solution an hypothesis has to cover
positive examples and should not cover negative examples of the target concept [De Raedt,
1997]. This set of solutions, inheriting its partial order from the Hypothesis language is called
the Version Space [Mitchell, 1982] of the learning problem. This definition of concept
learning relies on a complete description of the examples. In [Hirsh, 1994], the author
proposes to slightly extend the notion of solution in order to use any piece of information
concerning the current example set. In this view, the definition of concept learning problems
2has also to be modified: a hypothesis has now to be compatible with any piece of information
related to an example of the current learning set.
Our central interrogation, following Hirsh, is what are the consequences of incompleteness in
examples on the solutions of a concept learning problem? We argue hereafter that there exists
two basic kind of incompleteness: abstraction and uncertainty that can also be mixed up. The
definition of compatibility will then depend on the nature of incompleteness of examples. We
will generically say that a candidate hypothesis has to be compatible with both positive and
negative incomplete examples and we will define compatibility as a pair of relations
(compatible
+
, compatible
-
) in such a way that a candidate hypothesis has to be compatible
+
with positive examples and compatible
-
 with negative examples. In order to illustrate these
notions, we consider examples of the concept fly. Each example is a bird that can be described
with the following features: it is light or not-light, it is migratory or not-migratory, and it has
one and only one color (either red or green). Here a hypothesis covers a complete example if
all features of the hypothesis belong to the example.
Pure abstraction leads to generalized examples. A generalized example is represented by only
part of the complete description of the example. This part is supposed to represent a sufficient
amount of information to determine the label of the example. As a consequence such an
example corresponds to a set of complete examples. A hypothesis is then compatible
+
 with a
positive generalized example if it covers all the corresponding positive complete examples.
Let us consider a green light migratory bird, considered as a positive example. Let us suppose
that concerning this particular bird we know that its label (i.e. positive) does not depend on its
color, thus resulting in the generalized example light migratory. The hypothesis light or red is
compatible
+
 with our example as the hypothesis covers both completed examples green light
migratory and red light migratory. In the same way a hypothesis is compatible
-
 with a
negative generalized example if it covers none of the corresponding negative complete
examples. Here light or red is not compatible
-
 with the generalized negative example not-light
migratory as light or red does cover one of the corresponding complete examples, namely red
not-light not-migratory. In this last case the hypothesis is correctly rejected though complete
description of our negative example (that includes green) would fail to reject the hypothesis.
Note that here compatible+ is not the negation of compatible
-
 and so we do need a pair of
relations rather than a unique coverage relation.
Uncertainty appears when the values of some features are unknown (and cannot be
determined) when describing an example. Whenever uncertainty concerns the part of the
description that would be sufficient to determine the label of the example, we have to deal
with both abstraction and uncertainty. An uncertain generalized example is then represented
as a set of possible generalized examples. One of these generalized examples corresponds to
our observed example. A hypothesis is then compatible with such an example if it is
compatible with at least one possible generalized example. Let us consider again the two
examples mentioned above but consider that we do not know whether they are light or not-
light. Our positive example is now represented as the two possible generalized examples light
migratory and not-light migratory. When checking the hypothesis stating that light or red
birds fly we observe that the hypothesis is compatible
+
 with the first possible generalized
example light migratory. As a consequence, light or red is compatible
+
 with our uncertain
generalized example {{light, migratory}, {not-light, migratory}}. Our negative example is
now represented as the same uncertain generalized example {{light, migratory}, {not-light,
migratory}}. Our hypothesis is also compatible
-
 with the second possible generalized example
3{not-light, migratory} and as a consequence the hypothesis is compatible with our negative
uncertain generalized example.
Our first purpose here is to define a logical learning setting to deal with incomplete examples.
We start from the Learning from interpretations learning setting defined in [De Raedt and
Dehaspe, 1997a]. Learning from interpretations extends to first order languages the basic
propositional learning setting to which most attribute-value concept learning methods are
related. We then define Learning from Possibilities that extends learning from interpretations
to cope with uncertain generalized examples illustrated above. In [De Raedt, 1997], the author
defines Learning from satisfiability and shows that the main logical learning settings, as
learning from interpretations and learning by entailment, reduce to (i.e. may be seen, after
applying a transformation, as special cases of) Learning from satisfiability. We show here that
Learning from Satisfiability in turn reduces to Learning from Possibilities and discuss issues
related to the class of hypotheses that are investigated.
The second purpose of the paper is to discuss a particular case of learning from Possibilities
that we denote as Assumptions based Learning. Here the purpose is to use some information
about the example that lies outside its description, as designed in a learning task, in order to
reduce the uncertainty of the example. We discuss the role of local and background
knowledge in Assumptions based Learning and discuss various properties concerning the case
in which hypotheses are DNF
 
formulas containing only positive literals (for instance H = ∃xy
(cube(x) ∧ Near(x,y)) ∨∃x (sphere(x)) ∨ .... ). We briefly discuss our solution [Bouthinon and
Soldano, 1999] to a RNA secondary structure prediction problem as an illustration of
Assumptions based Learning, and we discuss practical issues related to this real-world
problem.
Finally we discuss previous work addressing data incompleteness. In particular we discuss
handling of Missing Values in propositional concept learning methods, and integration of
abduction and induction in Inductive Logic Programming.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Learning and classification of incomplete examples
In the Version space view of noise free concept learning from examples, as proposed by T.
Mitchell [Mitchell, 1982], each example, either positive or negative, acts as a constraint that
eliminates some hypotheses from the concept space. The version space Sol(E) is then the set
of solutions of the concept learning task, given the current set E of positive and negative
examples. Following Hirsh [Hirsh, 1994] we argue that such a constraint can represent any
piece of information that shrinks the version space. In our view a (possibly incomplete)
example precisely is such a piece of information extracted from some observation. To express
concept learning in this more general view we use the following notion of compatibility that
relates hypotheses to examples:
Definition:  A hypothesis H is compatible with an example whenever this example does not
eliminate the hypothesis H from the Version Space.
As a consequence, the set of solutions (i.e. the Version space) of a noise free concept learning
problem is defined as the set of hypotheses that are compatible with all the (possibly
incomplete) positive and negative examples. However the definition of compatibility will
4depend on the class (either positive or negative) of the example. So compatibility will be
represented as a pair of relations (compatible
+
, compatible
-
) relating hypotheses to examples.
Usually concept learning from examples [De Raedt, 1997] relies on a membership relation
between hypotheses and examples denoted as Cover and such that a hypothesis should cover
positive examples and should not cover negative examples. This requires that compatible
-
 is
defined as not compatible
+
. However we will further see that this constraint has to be relaxed
when dealing with incomplete examples.
The basic property of the Version space is that hypotheses are monotonically rejected when
some new complete example e is provided. This basic property that holds for complete
examples should still hold for incomplete examples. We consider here that some new
constraint c on the learning set is provided thus turning E in E'= E ∪{c}. Such a constraint
corresponds either to a new (possibly incomplete) example or to some new information
reducing uncertainty on a previous example, or generalizing some previous example. Anyway
Monotonicity of Elimination has to be preserved:
Definition (Monotonicity of Elimination):
  A hypothesis eliminated from the version space corresponding to a learning set E will stay
outside the Version Space whatever new constraint c is added to the learning set E.
To further discuss concept learning from incomplete examples, we will use a generic learning
setting definition relying on the compatibility relation. The compatibility relation will depend
on the nature of incompleteness of examples:
Definition : (Generic Learning setting):
H is a solution to the learning problem associated to the learning set E divided into positive
examples E
+
 and negative examples E
-
 iff
H is compatible
+
 with all examples in E
+
, and
H is compatible
-
 with all examples in E
-
When learning is achieved and that one hypothesis H is selected, new instances should be
classified as either positive or negative. In order to classify a new incomplete instance we
have to check whether positive and negative classification of the instance are consistent with
the selected hypothesis H. When dealing with incomplete examples various situations may
occur: positive and negative classification being both consistent or none of them being
consistent with the selected hypothesis. Consistency will be expressed using the compatibility
relations:
Definition: (Consistency):
- Positive classification of an instance i is consistent (with the selected hypothesis H)
whenever H is compatible
+
 with the instance.
- Negative classification of an instance i is consistent (with the selected hypothesis H)
whenever H is compatible
-
 with the instance.
This leads to the following generic classification setting:
Definition (Generic classification setting):
A new instance is classified as
- Positive whenever positive classification is consistent and negative classification is not.
5- Negative whenever negative classification is consistent and positive classification is not.
- Uncertain, whenever both positive and negative classification are consistent.
- Contradictory, whenever neither positive nor negative classification is consistent.
As we will further see, uncertain classification happens when instances are uncertain, and
contradictory classification happens when instances are abstracted.
In what follows we consider as hypotheses, formulas of a logical language.  Constraints on a
hypothesis concerns which interpretations should be or not models of the hypothesis.
2.2 Logic
In this paper we focus on Inductive Logic Programming frameworks [Flach, 1992;
Muggleton, 1992; De Raedt 1997] where examples and hypothesis are formalized in logical
languages. We present in hereunder syntactical and semantic elements of logic (see
[Nienhuys-Cheng and Wolf, 1997] chapters 2 and 3 for details) useful to describe the logical
learning settings presented hereafter. All these settings are based on a first-order language L
whose syntax and semantics are described below. Note that the reader is supposed to be
familiar with basic foundations of logics.
2.2.1 Syntax
From a syntactic point of view L is based on a set of predicates P, a set of variables V, no
functional symbols other than a set of constants HU, the logical relations {∧, ∨, ←} and the
quantifiers {∃ , ∀}. A term t of L is either a constant or a variable. An atom p(t1,..,tk) is
composed of a predicate symbol p and k terms (k ≥ 0). A literal is either an atom, (then
denoted as a positive literal), or the negation ¬a  of an atom a (then denoted as a negative
literal). A clause a1 ∨…∨ am ∨ ¬b1∨…∨ ¬bn is a disjunction of literals (ai and bj are atoms),
and may be written as  a1 ∨…∨ am← b1∧…∧ bn . A Horn clause is either written as a← b1∧…∧
bn (a definite clause) or as ← b1∧…∧ bn (a negative clause). Note that as literals are clauses, a
positive literal a will often be written a← , and a negative literal ¬a will be written a← . In
this paper we only consider universally quantified clauses, i.e. clauses in which all variables
appearing in a clause are in the scope of a universal quantifier∀. For instance the clause∀x ∀y
(p(x) ← q(x,y)) will be written∀(p(x) ← q(x,y)) or even p(x)← q(x,y). A clausal theory is a
conjunction of universally quantified clauses ∀c1 ∧…∧ ∀cq (each ci is a clause), which will be
also denoted as a set of clauses {c1; …;cq}. We also call CNF formulas such clausal theories.
Let us define a cube as a conjunction of literals ¬a1 ∧…∧ ¬am ∧ b1∧…∧ bn (where ai and bj
are atoms). We will call DNF formula a disjunction of existentially quantified cubes as ∃ d1
∨… ∨ ∃dq (where each di is a cube). For instance ∃x∃y(¬p(x) ∧ q(y)) ∨ ∃z r(z) is a DNF
formula. A DNF
+
 formula is a DNF formula with no negative literal.
Note that a cube is the negation of a clause (and conversely), and a DNF formula is the
negation of a CNF formula (and conversely).
Any CNF or DNF formula (and more specifically a clause, a cube or a literal) is said ground
when it contains no variables (in such a case quantifiers are irrelevant).
2.2.2 Semantics
The semantics says how to assign a truth value (either TRUE or FALSE) to a formula.
In this paper we will focus on Herbrand interpretations that are based on a specific domain of
interpretation, called a Herbrand universe and that simply is the set of constants HU. HU is
the semantic domain used to interpret terms (constant and variables): a constant c of HU is
6interpreted as itself, and any variable v is interpreted as an element e of HU thanks to the
substitution {v/e}. Thus given a non quantified formula f having q variables {v1, …,vq}, fθ  is a
ground formula iff θ = {v1/e1, …,vq/eq} substitutes each occurrence of each variable vk in f
with the element ek of HU. For instance consider HU={a,b}, then light(a) ← red(a) is a
ground formula built from light(x) ← red(x) applying the substitution θ = {x/a}.
Let us define the Herbrand base HB as the set of ground atoms that can be formed from the
predicates in P and the constants in HU. A Herbrand interpretation i assigns a truth value to
each ground atom of HB. i divides HB into the set ip of true ground atoms (with truth value
TRUE) and the set in containing false ones (with truth value FALSE). For instance consider
HU = {a,b} and P = {light, red, green} in which each predicate is unary, then HB = {light(a),
light(b), red(a), red(b), green(a), green(b)}. Then a Herbrand interpretation i is defined as ip =
{light(a), light(b), red(a), green(b)} and in = {red(b), green(a)}. Note that from HB and ip we
can infer in, so when HB is fixed, the interpretation i is simply represented as its true part ip.
We can now assign a truth value to any DNF or CNF formula from an Herbrand interpretation
i based on the Herbrand base HB :
• a ground atom a is TRUE under i iff a is in ip
• a ground negative literal ¬a  is TRUE under i iff a is not in ip
• a universally quantified clause ∀(l1 ∨…∨ lm) (each lk is a literal) is TRUE under i iff
for each substitution θ grounding l1 ∨…∨ lm at least one ground literal lkθ is TRUE
under i
• a CNF formula ∀c1 ∧…∧ ∀cq is TRUE under i iff each clause∀ci is TRUE under i
• an existentially quantified cube ∃  (l1 ∧…∧ lm) is TRUE under i iff it exists a
substitution θ grounding (l1 ∧…∧ lm) in such a way that each ground literal lkθ is
TRUE under i
• a DNF formula ∃ d1 ∨… ∨ ∃dq  is true under i iff at least one cube∃dj is TRUE under i.
• Any DNF or CNF formula that cannot be computed as TRUE under i is FALSE under
i.
Consider for instance the Herbrand interpretation i defined above. The existentially quantified
cube c= ∃x (light(x) ∧ green(x)) is true under i since the substitution θ = {x/b} grounds c and
light(b) and green(b) are true under i.
A Herbrand interpretation i built on HB and under which a formula f is true is called a
Herbrand model of f. We will further use the following notation:
Consider two formulas f and g :
f |≠HB ! means that f has at least one Herbrand model,
f |=HB ! means that f has no Herbrand model,
f |=HB g  means that each Herbrand model of f is an Herbrand model of g.
Note that all these relations depend on the Herbrand Base HB. However when the Herbrand
base is not ambiguous, we use the notation |= instead of |=HB , and we say interpretation
instead of Herbrand interpretation.
Furthermore, in this paper we will often define the language (i.e. the predicates P and the
constants HU) starting from a given Herbrand base HB. So P and HU are the sets of predicate
and constant symbols appearing in HB.
73 Concept learning from interpretations.
We discuss here data incompleteness in the learning from interpretations setting as defined by
L. De Raedt. This learning setting extends to first order logics, the basic propositional
learning setting to which most attribute-value concept learning methods are related. In the
propositional learning setting an example is an interpretation, i.e. it is the assignment of truth-
values to the set of atomic propositions of a propositional language. De Raedt considers
interpretations built on a Herbrand Base, thus extending this learning setting to first order
clausal theories. As seen in §2.2.2 an example corresponds then to the assignment of truth-
values to the set of grounded atoms built from a first order language. A similar learning
framework is found in  [Khardon, 1999] with as a motivation the extension of learnability
results and methods to first order languages.
In concept learning from interpretations, there are basically two classes of hypotheses in
investigation:
• The hypothesis corresponds to a theory i.e. a conjunction of facts and rules. Each rule
holds on all positive examples, and each negative example should contradict the theory.
For instance each clause in H= {square(X) ← light(X); light(X) ←white(X)} holds on the
two positive examples {square(a), light(a)} and {square(a),white(a), light(a)}, and H
contradicts the negative example {light(a)} as H implies that any light object should also
be square. The theory is then a CNF formula. CLAUDIEN [De Raedt and Dehaspe,
1997], and, in the case of attribute-value representations, CHARADE [Ganascia, 1993]
are examples of this first learning situation often referred to as “descriptive” learning, and
most often only positive examples are used. However systems as ICL [Van Laer et al,
1997] (using its CNF option) or LOGAN_H [Khardon, 2000] use both positive and
negative examples and build a clausal theory whose purpose is to classify new examples.
•  The hypothesis corresponds to a concept definition, i.e. the disjunction of various partial
definitions hi . Each partial definition covers part of the positive examples and no negative
examples. Consider for instance H= ∃X (square(X)∧light (X)) ∨ ∃X (white(X)∧light (X)),
the first term of H covers {square(a), light(a)} and the second covers  {white(a), light (a)}
while H does not cover the negative example {light(a)}. Note that the concept definition is
a DNF formula. The purpose is then clearly to classify new instances. ICL (in its DNF
mode) is an example of this second situation.
In what follows we make no assumptions regarding the class of formulas allowed as
hypotheses. However within most examples illustrating the ideas presented below, our
hypotheses will be DNF formulas. We also will discuss in §4.4 to what extent CNF formulas
can be learned using algorithms designed to learn DNF formulas and vice versa.
3.1 Learning from complete examples
Hereafter we will suppose that examples and hypothesis are built from a set of predicates P,
and that a specific domain HUk, i.e. a specific Herbrand universe representing observed
entities, is associated with each example. More precisely the example ik is a Herbrand
interpretation based on the Herbrand base HBk that is built from HUk and P.
Example 1
Let P={light(.), red(.), green(.), brighter(.,.)} be a set of predicates.
Our first example is made of two light objects so : HU1 = {a, b} and as a consequence
HB1= { light(a), light(b), red(a), red(b), green(a), green(b), brighter(a,a),
brighter(a,b), brighter(b,a), brighter(b,b)}. We know that the red one is brighter than
8the green one. In consequence the example is defined by the following Herbrand
interpretation built on HB1 :
 ip1 = { light(a), light(b), red(a), green(b), brighter(a,b)}
Our second example is made of three objects a, b and c, where a and b are light
objects but c is not light, and only a and b have a color:
HU2 = {a, b, c} and ip2 = { light(a), light(b), red(a), green(b), brighter(a,b)}.
The two examples are different: though they have the same positive part, in the second
example green(c) is false whereas in the first example green(c) is meaningless, as c
does not belong to the universe describing this example.
The hypothesis space is made of either DNF formulas or CNF formulas built from P, a set of
variable V, and a set (possibly empty) of constants HU = ∩ HUi. This means that a constant
that appears in a hypothesis has to belong to the domain of each example i (and further
instances). Such constants (as for instance, numbers 1, 2, 3, ...) should be considered as
"universal" constants with similar properties in all examples. For sake of clarity, we further
avoid constants within hypotheses in our illustrations. [Khardon, 2000] proposes a similar
representation though the author does not explicitly use Herbrand interpretations.
Compatibility is defined in Learning from interpretation as compatibleI=(compatibleI
+
 ,
compatibleI
-
 ) as follows:
Definition:  H is compatibleI
+
 with the positive example i iff i
 
is a model of H, and H is
compatibleI
-
 with a negative example i
 
iff i
- 
is not a model of H.
Note that compatibleI
-
 is defined as not compatibleI
 +
 : a unique relation Cover defined as "H
covers the example i iff i is a model of H" is sufficient to define the solutions H in the usual
way:
H is a solution iff:
H covers all positive examples and no negative example.
This relation is illustrated in the following Figure 1 
1
In example1, the clause ∀x light(x)  ( "all objects of the example are light ") covers the first
example and does not cover the second one.
Classifying a new (complete) instance w.r.t the selected definition H is straightforward in
learning from interpretations:  either positive classification of i is consistent (i is a model of
                                                 
1
 We will figure the set of models M(H) of a hypothesis H as a rectangle, and the set of models M(e) of a
formula e as an ellipse, moreover we will represent an interpretation by its name in bold characters.
Figure 1:  (a) i
+
 is a model of H. (b) i
-
 is not a model of H
          H
i
+
i
-
(a) (b)
         H
9H) or negative classification is consistent (i is not a model of H). As a result a new instance i
is classified either as positive or as negative.
In order to extend concept learning from interpretations, we will both change the
representation of the examples, and instantiate the compatibility relations.
3.2 Learning from Generalized examples
A constraint stronger than one corresponding to a complete example is obtained by
generalizing the example. A generalized example is a clausal theory e to which is associated a
Herbrand base HB. Each model built on HB of e acts on the solution space as a complete
example. Generalized examples express the idea that only part of the (complete) observed
example is sufficient to state that the example satisfies (or does not satisfies) the target
concept. Let us suppose, for instance, that we learn the target-concept fly about birds using
various attributes including color attributes, and suppose that when dealing with a migratory
bird, the color is unrelated to the target concept. This means that whether we encounter a
migratory bird as a positive example we have to describe it as a generalized positive example.
More precisely all instances whose differences from the positive example only concern colors,
should also be covered by the definition of the target concept. In the same way, if our
migratory bird represents a negative example of our target concept, then we will describe it as
a generalized negative example, and, as a consequence, no example identical to the negative
example, except concerning its color, should be covered by the definition of the target
concept.
Thus the compatibility relation pair compatibleG is defined as follows:
Definition
- H is compatibleG
+
 with a generalized  positive example e
+
 associated to the base HB iff each
model of e
+
 built on HB is a model of H, i.e. :
e
+
 |=HB H.
- H is compatibleG
-
 with a generalized negative example  e
-
 associated to the base HB iff no
model of e- built on HB is a model of H, i.e. :
e
-
 ∧ H |=HB !
As illustrated in Figure 2, the positive constraint means that H covers each complete example
within e
+
, whereas the negative constraint means that H does not cover any complete example
within e
-
.
Example 2
Suppose we have a propositional language defined by the atomic propositions P =
{bird, light, red, green}
Figure 2:  (a) H is compatibleG
+
 with e
+
: each model of e
+
 is a model of H
 (b) H is compatibleG
-
 with e
-
: no model of e
-
 is a model of H
e-
 H e
+
(a) (b)
H
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Let e
+
 ={bird; light)} be the clausal theory representing a generalized positive
example. As we do not state the color of our example, e
+
 has 4 models:
ip1 ={ bird, light}, ip2 = { bird, light, red}, ip3 ={ bird, light, green}, ip4 ={ bird, light,
red, green},
the hypothesis H = (bird∧light) ∨ (red∧light)  is compatible
+
 with e
+
 (all models of e
+
are models of H).
Let e
-
 = {bird ; ← light} represent a generalized  negative example. Here again we do
not state the color of the object, therefore e
-
 has again 4 models:
i'p1 = { bird}, i'p2 = { bird, red}, i'p3 = { bird, green}, i'p4 = { bird, red, green}
and H is also compatible with e
-
 (no model of e
-
 is a model of H).
Note that the literal red appears in H, possibly allowing H to be compatible with some
other positive example, in which color is relevant.
A generalized example represents a set of complete examples that all have to be compatible
with the hypothesis. As a consequence Monotonicity of Elimination is inherited from the case
of complete examples.
Learning and classification settings are obtained from our generic learning setting using the
compatibility relation pairs defined above. Now considering generalized instances, what is the
intended meaning of a generalized instance? Suppose that concerning migratory birds we
know that their class does not depend on their color. This means that the selected concept
definition should classify such a migratory bird, thus considered as a generalized instance, in
the same class whatever we know about its color.
Here contradictory classification appears whenever neither positive classification nor negative
classification is consistent with our concept definition H. As a consequence our concept
definition is no more satisfactory.
In our previous example suppose that we selected the hypothesis
H = bird ∧ red, and that we have to classify the generalized instance
e = {bird; migratory};
the generalized instance is classified as contradictory: we intended that the classification of
our instance should not depend on the color of migratory birds, and it does depend on their
color.
In other words generalized examples offers a way to use unlabeled examples to reject a
hypothesis, and so to shrink the solution space.
Finally, we should mention that a generalized example is not always related to one
observation, and so to one particular Herbrand Base, but may represent some piece of
background  knowledge . For instance the following generalized positive example:
e= { ∀bird(X)}
means that whenever all entities in an instance are birds then it should be classified as
positive.
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4 A general setting to learn from incomplete examples
4.1 Learning from Possibilities
We have seen in §3.2 that a clausal theory together with a Herbrand Base represent what is
sufficient to state about an example for relating it to a target concept.
A more general case arises when we face both uncertainty and generalization, i.e. when we
don't know all that would be sufficient to relate our example to the target concept. The most
general situation we can think of has the two following properties: 1) uncertainty in our
observation is such that we do not know which description amongst several possible
descriptions correspond to our observation, and 2) each description represents what we should
know about our observation for our learning purpose.
Imagine for instance that we observe a robot, which is a positive example of the concept
Task1. Also suppose that the arm of the robot is hidden and that either the arm holds a yellow
hammer or it holds a screwdriver and a screw.  Furthermore we know that in the later case the
color of the screwdriver does not matter as we do not need any more information to consider
the robot as a positive example of  Task1. So our example e
+
 will be represented by two
possible generalized examples P1 and P2. Both P1 and P2.include a set of clauses B that
represents background knowledge asserting, for instance, that the same object cannot be both
a hammer and a screwdriver:
e
+
 ={ P1, P2}
P1 = {arm(a); Holds(a,b); Hammer(b);Yellow(b); B} with HU={a,b}
P2 = {arm(a); Holds(a,b);Screwdriver(b); Holds(a,c); Screw(c); B} with HU={a,b,c}
Note that the subdomain defining the description of the robot depends on the "possibility" P
under consideration (i.e. HU(P1) ={a,b}and  HU(P2) ={a,b,c})
We can think of P1  as a complete example (a particular case of generalized example) in
which the arm of the robot only holds a hammer. Hence only constants a and b are used to
describe the example. P2  is a generalized example, as we do not mention the color of the
screwdriver (it could be yellow, but it does not matter).
To be compatible with our uncertain-generalized example, a  hypothesis has to be compatible
with P1 or  compatible with P2. For instance H =  ∃XY Holds(X,Y)∧Screw(Y) is compatible
+
with e
+  
as H is compatibleG
+ 
 with P2. In other words, H is compatible with the positive
example because, under the assumption that the hidden arm of the robot holds a screwdriver
and a screw, asserting P2  is sufficient to state that H is satisfied, and so H is an acceptable
definition for the target concept.
So we propose to represent an uncertain generalized example as a set e={P1, ...Pn} o f
consistent formulas, where each Pi stands for a "possible" generalized example.
In Learning from Possibilities, the compatibility relation pair compatibleP is so defined as
follows:
Definition (Compatibility in learning from Possibilities):
-H is compatibleP
 +
 with the example e
+
 ={P1, ...Pn } iff
∃Pi ∈ e
+
 such that Pi |=HB H
-H is compatibleP
 -
 with the example e
-
={P1, ...Pn }  iff
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∃Pi ∈ e
-
 such that Pi ∧ H |=HB !
In other words to be compatibleP
+ 
with a positive uncertain generalized example e
+
,
 
a
hypothesis H has to  be  compatibleG
+
 with at least one of the possibilities of e
+
. In the same
way, to be compatibleP
- 
with a negative uncertain generalized example e
-
,
 
a hypothesis H has
to be compatibleG
-  
with at least one of the possibilities of e
 -
. These relations are illustrated in
Figure 3.
Monotonicity of Elimination  is preserved in Learning from Possibilities as any new
information  concerning an uncertain-generalized  example  e results in eliminating  some
possibility Pi from e.
Regarding classification of uncertain-generalized examples, our generic classification setting
depends on consistency of positive and negative classification. Contradictory  classification
occurs when there is neither a possibility Pi the models of which are all models of H, nor a
possibility Pj of e that contains no models of H. Uncertain  classification occurs when there is
both a possibility Pi the models of which are all models of H, and a possibility Pj of e that
contains no models of H
Note that pure uncertain examples, generalized examples, and complete examples are
particular cases of examples in learning from possibilities:
a) Generalized examples
Whenever e = {P1} contains one single possibility associated to a Herbrand base,  e represents
a generalized example as defined in §3.2
b) Complete examples
Whenever e = {P1} contains one single possibility Pi that has exactly one model  built on the
Herbrand base HB associated to e, then e represents a complete example as defined in §3.1.
c) Pure uncertain examples
Whenever e = {P1, ...Pn} and each  possibility Pi has exactly one model  built on a unique
Herbrand base HB associated to e, then e corresponds to a set of interpretations on HB. Each
of these interpretations  refers to one possible identity of the observed example. Such a pure
uncertain example often corresponds to a formula of L whose models on HB are enumerated
in e. If we also denote as e this formula we obtain the following definition of compatibility:
Definition:
-H is compatibleU
+
 with a pure uncertain example e
+
 if there is some model of e
+
 on HB that
is a model of H. This may be rewritten as:
H ∧ e+ |≠ !
Figure 3  (a) H is compatibleP
+
 with e
+
 (b) H is compatibleP
-
  with e
-
H
P1
(a)
Pi
Pn
(b)
H
Pn
P1
Pi
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          H
e
+
e
-
(a) (b)
Figure 4:  (a) H is compatiblU
+
 with e
+
 (b) H is compatibleU
--
 with e
-
         H
-H is compatibleU
-
 with a pure uncertain example e
-
 if there is some model of e
-
 on HB that is
not a model of H. This may be rewritten as:
e
-
 |≠ H
Because uncertain generalized examples can represent uncertain examples, generalized
examples or complete examples learning from possibilities is the most general setting
presented here.
4.2 Learning from Possibilities vs. Learning from satisfiability
By generalizing the representation of an example from a complete interpretation to a clausal
theory, [De Raedt, 1997] and [De Raedt and Dehaspe, 1997] define "learning from
satisfiability".
The basic motivation of representing an example as a formula (or the set of its models) was to
address incompleteness. However in learning from satisfiability this incompleteness does not
have the same meaning depending on whether the example is positive or negative.
E
+
 and E
-
 are sets of clausal theories. Any accepted hypothesis H is a clausal theory that
satisfies:
e
+
 ∧ H |≠ !  for all examples e
+
 of E
+
 and
e
-
 ∧ H |= !  for all examples e
-
 of E
-
.
When referring to our classification of examples, the first equation means that the clausal
theory e
+ 
represents a pure uncertain positive example and the second equation means that the
clausal theory e
-
 represent a generalized  negative example. This asymmetry technically
comes from the formulation of concept learning using a single "cover" relation that is negated
when considering negative examples. That's the reason why we formulate concept learning
from incomplete data using a pair of compatibility relations. However, consider that
satisfiability was originally proposed with two motivations: first to extend learning from
interpretations to deal with uncertainty for descriptive learning tasks, second, to reformulate
most Inductive Logic Programming learning settings. Concerning the former motivation, as
usually no negative examples are used in descriptive learning systems (as in CLAUDIEN)
there is no drawback in ignoring uncertainty in negative examples.  In the other hand, the ILP
learning settings that are reformulated are all related to the so-called "ILP normal setting"
whose purpose is to derive positive examples and avoid deriving negative examples. Again a
single "cover" relation is sufficient to reformulate these learning settings in which basically all
the useful knowledge about examples is supposed to be known.
Another point in which our framework differs from learning from satisfiability, is that
Learning from satisfiability represents hypotheses as clausal theories when one of our
practical purpose is to extend DNF as found in propositional learning  to existential first order
DNF. Finally we should note that learning from satisfiability does not explicitly discuss the
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previous association of a Herbrand base to each example.  This is because, as far as examples
e are represented as clausal theories and hypotheses H also are clausal theories, then checking
whether e ∧  H has a model can be safely performed by only considering the Herbrand
interpretations built from constants and predicates appearing in e ∧ H [Nienhuys-Cheng and
Wolf, 1997]. When considering other formulas, as DNF hypotheses, or considering other
equations as e |=H, this property does not hold, and so it is necessary to clearly define what
constants are to be considered  when representing our state of knowledge about each example.
4.3 Learning from satisfiability reduces to learning from possibilities
In [De Raedt, 1997] the author shows that the main concept learning settings, as learning
from interpretations and learning by entailment reduce to (i.e. may be seen, after applying a
transformation, as special cases of) "learning from satisfiability" and that learning from
satisfiability does not reduce to these learning settings.
First, let us introduce the notion of reduction as defined in [De Raedt, 1997]. In De Raedt
view, a learning problem is defined as a language of hypothesis Lc, a language of examples Le,
a membership relation Cover that specifies how Lc relates to Le, and a set of examples E of
some target concept. Each example has the form e =(p, Class) where p belongs to Le and
Class is either Positive  or Negative. Various learning settings  are compared in this work,
depending on the representation of examples  and the related coverage relation. The solution
set Sol (E) is the set of hypotheses that each covers all the positive examples and does not
cover any negative example. The notion of reduction allows relating the various type of
coverage.  The basic idea is that if there exists a reduction ρ from learning under CoverA to
Learning under CoverB, then learning problems under CoverA can be solved using the data
transformation ρ and algorithms for learning CoverB. As a consequence Learning under
CoverB seems a more general task than learning under CoverA.
Our first purpose here is to show that learning from satisfiability reduces to learning from
possibilities. However learning from possibilities relies on a pair of compatibility relations
(Compatible
+
, Compatible
-
), rather than on a unique coverage relation, and as a consequence
the definition of the solution set has to be slightly modified : The solution set Sol (E) is now
the set of hypotheses that are compatible
+
 with all the positive examples and compatible
- 
with
all the negative examples. This leads to the following definition of reduction, where
CompatibleA and CompatibleB are two compatibility relation pairs, associated to the two
learning settings A and B:
Definition: A reduction from learning under CompatibleA to learning under CompatibleB  is a
function ρ that maps any learning set EA (under CompatibleA ) onto a learning set EB = {ρ(e) |
e ∈ E} (under CompatibleB) of B such that SolA(EA) = SolB(EB).
The solution set defined under the coverage relation Cover is equivalent to the solution set
defined under the pair of compatibility relations (Cover,  Not_Cover). As a consequence our
reduction notion is more general that the notion proposed by De Raedt and all the reduction
results presented in [De Raedt, 97] are true under our notion of reduction. Furthermore we
have the following results:
Proposition 1: Learning from satisfiability reduce to learning from possibilities
(proof in appendix A.2)
Proposition 2 : Learning from possibilities does not reduce to learning from satisfiability
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(proof in appendix A.3)
4.4 Learning DNF vs. Learning CNF.
DNF and CNF (see part 3) are two usual classes of formulas that are currently investigated in
concept learning. Moreover by negating a DNF we obtain a CNF and vice versa. Furthermore
learning from interpretations a formula H  from E
+
 and E
-
 has be shown as equivalent to
learning not-H from E
+
 and E
-
  [Van Laer et al, 1997]. More precisely let us denote as SolA(L,
E=E+,E-) the set of solutions under compatibleA where L is the class of formulas that are
admitted as solutions, let not-E be the transformation that switch the labels of the elements of
E, and let not-L be the class of formulas obtained by negating formulas of L. Then:
Proposition 3:  Let I represents learning from interpretations (i.e. compatibleI= (is-a-model,
is-not-a-model)) then SolI(L, E)  = SolI(not-L, not-E).  [Van Laer, 1997]
The same proposition is false in learning from satisfiability, but it's true in learning from
possibilities:
Proposition 4:  Let P represents learning from possibilities  then SolP(L, E)  = SolP(not-L, not-
E) .
Proof: Let  H be an element of L that belongs to SolP(L, E=E+,E-). This means that
1) for any element e of E
+  
it exists p ∈ e such that : p |=H and 2) for any element e of E
-
 it
exists p ∈ e such that p ∧ H |= !.
If we switch the labels of elements of E
+
, then the elements( e, positive) of E
+
  are transformed
as not( e, positive )=(e, negative). We have then not(E+)=E
'-
 and following 1) for any element
e of E
'-
, it exists p ∈ e such that p |=H and so p ∧ ¬H|=!, i.e. all negative elements in E
`-
 are
compatibleP- with not-H.
In the same way by transforming elements of E
-
 as not(e, negative )=(e, positive) we obtain
not(E
-
)=E'
+
 and following 2) for any element e of E'
+
, it exists p ∈ e such that p ∧ ¬H|=!
and so p |=¬H, i.e. all positive elements in E'
+
 are compatibleP+ with ¬H.
Now Learning from Interpretations and Learning from satisfiability are both particular cases
of Learning from Possibilities. More precisely they both correspond to reductions (see §5.3)
in which the labels of the examples are unchanged. So we are interested in characterizing the
reductions for which proposition 4 is true. A quick look at the proof above shows that the
proof holds as far as the compatibility relations have the following property: for any example
e, H is Compatible
+
 with e iff ¬H is Compatible
-
 with e. As long as a reduction of Learning
from Possibilities preserves this property, Proposition 4 holds. This is the case in particular of
Assumptions Based learning described  in the next section.
4.5 Local Knowledge and background Knowledge.
From a theoretical point of view both background knowledge and local knowledge concerning
a given uncertain-generalized example may be freely included in the representation of the
example as a clausal theory. So there is no theoretical issue related to background or local
knowledge  in Learning from Possibility. However Learning from Possibility is a very general
learning setting and we will discuss the role of background and local knowledge on the more
specific learning setting presented in the next section.
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5 Assumptions based learning
We discuss here a specific case (i.e. a reduction) of Learning from Possibilities. Let us
suppose that we face a concept learning problem in which each example is uncertain and that
we have some information that we can use to shrink uncertainty, but that we do not want to
use to learn the target concept. This simply means that our inductive bias defines how each
example should be described but that we need some extra information to reduce our
uncertainty about the examples. Such an example is then denoted as an extended uncertain
example.
More formally we associate to an uncertain extended example a clausal theory e. The formula
e represents our state of knowledge on the example and is associated to an extended Herbrand
base HBe such that we only consider models of e built on HBe as possible representations of
the example. However the intended complete description of the example for our learning task
should be an interpretation built on only a part HB of HBe. HB is also a Herbrand base built
from less constants and predicates than HBe. HB is denoted as a subbase of HBe. So the
extended uncertain example is defined as the clausal theory e together with the extended
Herbrand base HBe and with  the Herbrand subbase HB.
Example 3.a
Let HB ={light, white, square} and HBe =  {light, white, polygon, square} expressing
that the complete description of the positive example e relies on the truth values of
light, white and square, and that we also use the truth value of polygon to help
reducing the uncertainty concerning the truth value of light, white and square:
e  ={light ; polygon←square;  ←polygon∧ white}
Here we know that our example can’t be a white polygon, so it can’t be both light and
square. This results in the two following possible descriptions of the example for our
learning purpose:
{light, white}
{light, square}
Note that as in learning from possibilities the interpretations built on HB have to assign a truth
value to hypotheses. So all predicates (and possibly constants) appearing in a hypothesis have
to appear in all Herbrand bases HB associated to extended uncertain examples.
We give hereunder various definitions and notations before formally defining Assumptions
Based Learning:
An interpretation j on the subbase HB of HBe is called a partial interpretation: no truth-value
is assigned to atoms of HBe-HB.
An interpretation i on HBe is an extension of an interpretation j on HB iff jp ⊆ ip and jn ⊆ in.
Conversely j is the projection of i on HB. We will denote as ext(j) the set of all extensions of
j on HBe.
An interpretation j built on HB is a partial model of a formula f iff at least one interpretation
in ext(j) is a model of f.
Let j be an interpretation built on HB and such that jp = {t1,..,tm} and jn = {f1,...,fn}. Then we
note ct(j) = ct(jp) ∧ ct(jn) the clausal theory containing the positive clauses (ct(jp)= {t1;..;tm})
and the negative clauses (ct(jn)= {f1←;...;fn←}) representing the true and false ground atoms
of j. Note that the interpretation j is the single model of ct(j) built on HB, and that ext(j)
represents the models of ct(j) built on HBe.
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Now given an extended example e, the possible complete examples are the partial models j
(built on HB) of e. The set of possible complete examples is computed by intersecting models
of ct(j) and models of e. In order to define the compatibility of a hypothesis H with an
extended example e, we will then check whether H is compatible with at least one possible
complete example issued from e.  This results in the following definition of compatibilityA
when dealing with uncertain extended examples:
Definition
H is compatibleA
+
 with the extended positive example e
+
 iff there exists an interpretation j
built on HB such that:
ct(j) ∧ e |≠HBe !      and j is a model of H 
H is compatibleA
-
 with the extended negative example e
-
 iff there exists an interpretation  j
built on HB such that:
ct(j) ∧ e |≠HBe !     and j is not a model of H
Here ct(j) represents all the positive and negative literals that are logical consequences of e
plus a set of assumptions on the truth-value of the remaining atoms of HB.
Note that when HB  = HBe, extended examples simply are pure uncertain examples as defined
in. §2.2.1.
Example 3-b
The hypothesis H = white∧ square is not compatibleA
+
 with the positive example e
since  (see example 3-a) the only partial models of e are {light, white} and {light,
square}, and none of them is a model of white∧ square.
This should not be confused with inductive biases on the hypothesis language. In the previous
example we could have considered the example as a pure uncertain example, represented
using the base HBe, and stating that an inductive bias exclude polygon of the hypothesis
language. However such an approach is inaccurate if the desired representation HB contains
fewer constants than the extended representation HBe as shown in the following example:
Example 4
We search for an hypothesis built on the unary predicates P ={light, white, square}.
In order to reduce uncertainty about an example describing a single object a, we use a
binary predicate Near together with information concerning a second object b, so we
have:
HB  ={light(a), white(a), square(a)} and
HBe={light(a), white(a), square(a), light(b), white(b), square(b), Near(a,b),
Near(b,a), Near(a,a), Near(b,b)}
Our extended uncertain example is represented by the following formula:
e={light(a); Near(a,b); ←Near(x,x); ←square(x) ∧ white(x) ∧ Near(x,y) }
This means that the object a cannot be both square and white as a is near an other
object b.
We have then two partial models of e built on HB:
jp1 ={light(a), white(a)}
jp2 ={light(a), square(a)}
The point is that we need information concerning the object b in order to reduce the
uncertainty about the object a: if we only consider information concerning a, we have
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a third partial model of e on HB, namely {light(a), white(a), square(a)} that cannot be
the correct description of our example.
Assumptions based learning is a special case of learning from possibilities. More precisely
Assumptions based learning reduces to learning from possibilities in such a way that labels of
examples are preserved by the data transformation. Let us consider an uncertain extended
example e, the corresponding uncertain-generalized example ep = {P1,...,Pu} is such that each
Pk is the clausal theory ct(jk) corresponding to one partial model jk of e built on HB. So ep
describe all possible complete examples intended when defining the uncertain extended
example e.
In Example 4 the uncertain extended example e is thus translated as:
ep = { P1={light(a) ; white(a); ← square(a)}, P2= {light(a) ; ← white(a); square(a)} }
5.1 Assumptions based learning of DNF+.
We investigate here the properties of Assumptions based learning when hypotheses are DNF+
formulas as for instance:
H = ∃ (a1 ∧ …an) ∨∃ (b1 ∧ …bn)∨ .... (all literals in the formula are positive literals).
Definition: Order on interpretations
Consider two interpretations j1 and j2. We will say that j1 is smaller (respectively greater) than
j2 iff j1p ⊆ j2p (respectively j1p ⊇ j2p).
For our learning purpose we are interested in partial models of e  on HB . Such an
interpretation  is denoted as:
- a maximal partial model of e on HB, when no greater interpretations on HB are
partial models of e.
- a minimal partial model of e on HB, when no smaller interpretations on HB are
partial models of e..
Proposition 5  Let H be a DNF+ hypothesis and e be a clausal theory representing an
extended uncertain example then:
a) If there is no maximal partial model of e on HB that is a model of H, then there is
no partial model of e on HB that is a model of H.
b) If there is no minimal partial model of e on HB that is not a model of H, then there
is no partial model of e on HB that is not a model of H.
(proof is given appendix A.4)
Corollary  –
a) H is compatibleA
+
 with a positive extended uncertain example e iff there is a
maximal partial model of e on HB that is a model of H.
b) H is compatibleA
-
 with a negative extended uncertain example e if and only if there
is a minimal partial model of e on HB that is not a model of H.
As a consequence we only need to check maximal partial models of e built on HB when e is a
positive example. Also we only need to check minimal partial models of e built on HB when e
is a negative example.
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Furthermore searching partial models of e corresponds to a combinatorial search whose tests
can be made efficient if we only need positive assumptions. The following proposition shows
that this is the case when considering positive examples:
Proposition 6 – H is compatibleA
+
 with the extended uncertain positive example e iff there
exists an interpretation j built on HB such that:
ct(jp) ∧ e |≠HB) !      and j is a model of H 
 (proof is given appendix A.5)
Note that negative assumptions are completely useless here, as checking whether an
interpretation j is a model of a DNF+ hypothesis is also performed only considering the
positive part jp of the interpretation j.
Unfortunately when considering negative examples the corresponding property (i.e. replacing
“positive” by “negative” and “j is a model of H” by “j is not a model of H” in Proposition 6 )
is not true. Note however that whenever e
-
 is a Horn clausal theory, then there is only one
minimal model, namely the Herbrand minimal model, whose positive ground atoms are the
ones that are logical consequences of e.
This means that we can just forget assumptions when considering negative examples and in
this case the combinatorial search is useless:
Proposition 7 – Let e
-
 be a negative extended example represented as a Horn clausal theory,
let HBe be the associated Herbrand Base, and let HB ⊆ HBe be the Herbrand base used for
learning.
A DNF
+
 hypothesis H is compatibleA
-
 with e
-
 iff the projection on HB of the unique least
Herbrand model of e
-
 is not a model of H
(proof is given in A.6)
5.2 Constructing Hypotheses in Assumptions based learning of DNF+.
In our setting uncertain examples do not depend on each other, they are independent
observations and the color of b in an example  may be freely assumed as green with no
consequences on truth values of green(b) in an other example (note that b represents two
different entities in e
+
 and e
-
). This means that a hypothesis H may be checked as compatible
with each example (positive or negative) independently. However, note that we have to be
cautious when the hypotheses are constructed  piece by piece.
Constructing hypotheses with set covering methods
Consider for instance a concept learning algorithm that uses the standard greedy set covering
algorithm searching for a DNF
+
 formula: a first conjunction h1 is selected that covers part of
the positive examples and no negative examples, then a second one h2 is selected that covers
all the uncovered positive examples and no negative instances, then H = h1 ∨  h2 is output as
the solution. However, in our uncertainty setting, we should verify that for each negative
example e
-
 there is at least one model of e
- 
that makes both h1 and h2 compatible with the
negative example.  In other words we should first check compatibility of h1 with e
-
, then
compatibility of h1∨  h2 with e
-
 and so on.
Example 5
Consider the DNF+ formula  H = square ∨  light, and suppose that h1=square is
compatibleA
-
 with a given negative example e
-
( there is a model of e
-
 in which square
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is false) and h2=light is also compatibleA
-
 with e
-
(there is a model of e
-
 in which light
is false)
Now, if for all models of e
-
 either square is true or light is true, then H  is not
compatible with e
-
. This may happen for instance with the following negative
example: e
- 
 = {red; square∨ light}
Fortunately, when examples are represented as Horn clausal theory, partial hypotheses can
actually be selected independently:
Proposition 8:
Let H be a DNF+ formula, h be an existential conjunction, and e be a Horn clausal theory
representing an extended uncertain example. Then:
If  H and  h are both compatibleA with e then the DNF+ H∨ h is compatibleA with e.
(proof is given appendix A.7)
5.3 The role of local Knowledge and background Knowledge in assumptions
based learning.
Here background knowledge as local knowledge is included in the clausal theory e
representing our state of knowledge about an uncertain extended example. Let us denote an
uncertain extended example as e = Fe ∧  Ke where Fe represents the facts concerning the
example, i.e. positive and negative ground literals of HBe, and where Ke represents clauses
representing either rules or constraints. Ke is divided into the Background Knowledge B that
holds for all examples, and Le that represents the local knowledge, i.e. clauses and constraints
that specifically hold for the example represented as e. For instance in example 4,
F={light(a); Near(a,b)}, B={←Near(x,x); ←square(x) ∧ white(x) ∧ Near(x,y)} and Le =∅.
Now in the definition of compatibleA we have the following (rewritten) condition :
…   “iff there exists an interpretation  j built on HB such that: ct(j) ∧ Fe ∧B ∧ Le |≠HBe !” So
here knowledge helps to establish the set of interpretations j built on HB that do not contradict
the facts Fe  and the knowledge Ke. Such an interpretation j is so made of facts in F built on
HB plus assumptions, consistent with Fe ∧ Ke, on truth-values of the other atoms of HB.
Furthermore background and local Knowledge can be used in order to make efficient the
computation of these interpretations. The idea is that we can make assumptions on a subset
HBa of HBe different from HB: we use then the background and local Knowledge in order to
deduce the truth value of ground atoms describing the possible complete examples. This
results in the following variant of Assumptions Based Learning :
Let HBa be the part of HBe on which assumptions are made. Then H is compatible with an
example e whether:
There exists an interpretation a on HBa such that:
ct(a) ∧ e|≠HBe !  and
ct(a) ∧   e |= HBe ct( j) where j is an interpretation built on HB, and
j is a model of H, if e is a positive example, or
j is not a model of H, if e is a negative example.
Deduction should be complete i.e. all partial models j of e built on HB should be deducible
from assumptions on HBa.
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In section  §5.4.2 we exemplify this variant on our RNA problem.
5.4 RNA secondary structure prediction in assumptions based learning
framework
5.4.1 RNA secondary structures
RNA secondary structure prediction is a molecular biology problem that we have represented
in the framework of assumptions based learning from Horn clauses.
A RNA molecule corresponds to a sequence of nucleotides and forms a three-dimensional
structure. The RNA secondary structure is a simpler representation characterizing the main
biological properties of the molecule and consists in a bi-dimensional conformation of helices
(regions where the stretch of RNA forms spirals). In most cases the secondary structure is
unknown and the RNA sequence is used to predict the secondary structure. In this work we
use the fact that a RNA sequence contains occurrences of lexical patterns called palindromes
from which we can predict a set of possible secondary structures: a helix of the secondary
structure always corresponds to a palindrome of the sequence but the converse can be false.
So the prediction of the secondary structure from an RNA sequence comes to identifying and
describing the subset of palindromes that corresponds to the set of helices.
To describe a possible secondary structure we use the three following structural binary
relations (as illustrated Figure 5) defined on pair of palindromes: Precedes (P), Overlaps (O),
Includes (I).
(1) P(p1,p2)
(2) O(p1,p2)
(3) I(p1,p2)
Figure 5:(1), (2) and (3) are the three structural relations between two palindromes p1 and
p2.
Additional biological information helps to determine the subset of palindromes corresponding
to helices and thus representing the structure of a RNA sequence. In particular two
palindromes can be structurally incompatible and as a consequence cannot both represent
helices. Furthermore the set of helices corresponds to one of the maximal subsets of
compatible palindromes.
Figure 6 illustrates the set of palindromes of a given sequence, their relations, and two
possible secondary structures.
p1
p2
p2
 p2 
 p1 
 p1 
 p1 
 p1 
 p1 
 p1 
 p1 
 p1 
p1
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(1)
(2)
Figure 6: (1) The palindromes {a, b, c, d}, here b and c are incompatible. (2) The two
possible secondary structures
5.4.2 Learning the consensus secondary structure of a set of RNA sequences
The problem we address here consists in learning structural patterns that occur in the structure
of the members of a set of RNA molecules. An example is a RNA molecule represented as a
sequence of nucleotides. To represent the example we first have to compute the set of
palindromes found on the sequence, and the possible structural relations between compatible
palindromes together with the pairs of incompatible palindromes.
Here examples are positive uncertain extended examples as found in our assumptions based
learning framework: we need incompatibility information to reduce uncertainty, but regarding
learning we only need atoms describing structural relations:
o  An example e is then a Horn clausal theory that contains the general constraint of
incompatibility of palindromes, structural and incompatibility relations between
palindromes. HBe is the Herbrand Base of this clausal theory.
o The part HB of HBe only contains the ground atoms describing the structural relations.
However, as incompatibility concerns palindromes and not structural relations the most
natural and efficient way to investigate the various possible structures is first to investigate the
maximal subsets of compatible palindromes, and then to deduce the corresponding grounded
structural relations. This corresponds to assumptions based learning using background and
local knowledge as discussed in §5.3
Example 7
Consider the palindromes given Figure 6.
The base on which assumptions will be made is:
 HBa= {hel(a), hel(b), hel(c), hel(d), hel(e)}
The base HB on which possible complete examples are described is formed from the
predicates O, I, P corresponding to the structural relations, and from the constants
{a,b,c,d,e} representing the palindromes observed in the sequence.
a b d
c
e
a b ed
s1
a
c ed
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The base HBe on which extended examples are represented includes HB, HBa and the
ground atoms built on the incompatibility relation # .
- #(b,c)← means that the palindromes p1 and p2 are not compatible.
- ←  (#(X,Y) ∧ hel(X) ∧ hel(Y)) is the clause defining that two incompatible
palindromes cannot be both helices.
When we observe two palindromes p1 and p2 on the sequence, we also observe the
corresponding structural relation R(p1, p2) under the assumption that both p1 and p2 are
helices. This corresponds to the clause R(p1, p2)← hel(p1) ∧  hel (p2). where R is one of
the three structural relations O,  I, P.
An example e = is then represented as the clause that define incompatibility together
with the structural information and incompatibilities:
e = Fe ∧B ∧ Le where
Fe ={#(b,c)←},
B ={← (#(X,Y∧ hel (X) ∧ hel(Y))},
Le=    {I(a,b) ← hel(a) ∧ hel(b); O(a,c) ←hel (a)∧ hel(c);
I(a,d) ← hel (a) ∧ hel(d); I(a,e) ← hel (a)∧ hel(e);
P(b,d) ← hel(b) ∧ hel(d); P(b,e) ← hel(b) ∧ hel(e) ;
I(c,d) ← hel(c) ∧ hel(d) ;  I(c,e) ←hel (c)∧ hel(e);
O(d,e) ←   hel(d) ∧ hel(e)}
We don't represent here negative facts concerning structural relations as ← O(a,b),
←#(b,c), or ←O(a,a), because, given a set of positive assumptions on helices, together
with the facts and local and background theory, we deduce the corresponding set of
positive assumptions on structural relations that represents a possible structure.
From the two maximal sets of assumptions on HBa:
a1= {hel(a), hel(b), hel(d), hel(e)} and
a2 ={hel(a), hel(c), hel(d), hel(e)},
we obtain the following possible examples described on HB:
jp1 ={I(a,b),  I(a,d), I(a,e), P(b,d), P(b,e), O(d,e)}
jp2 ={O(a,c),  I(a,d), I(a,e), I(c,d), I(c,e), O(d,e)}
A hypothesis corresponds here to a structural pattern. For instance ∃XYZ  O(X,Y) ∧I(X,
Z)∧I(Y, Z) represents a pattern stating that a helix X overlaps an helix Y and includes an helix
Z, and stating that the helix Y also includes the helix Z.
An issue with Assumptions based learning as described here is that all possibilities have to be
considered. Our RNA problem, in consequence, would not be tractable since each RNA
sequence we consider actually results in a huge amount of possible examples. Fortunately
these possible examples are not equally probable. If we associate to each possible example a
probability, then the probability that the example is a model of a given hypothesis H is simply
the sum of the probabilities of the possible examples that are models of H
2
.. In our application
we use a particular property of our RNA problem: for each sequence we can rank structures
and keep only few of the most probable structures with a weak probability to reject the correct
                                                 
2
 Suppose that the possible examples j1 and j2 in Example 7 have probabilities 0.9 and 0.1, then the example is a
model of the hypothesis H1 =∃XY O(X,Y) with probability 1, since both j1 and j2 are models of H
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structure. So, though we had thousands of possible structures for each sequence, only few of
them (about 200) were considered. Of course this means that the most probable structures of
each sequence are searched only once prior to learning. The overall method and results is
extensively described in [Bouthinon and Soldano, 1999b].
6 Related work
6.1 Multiple instance learning
In this setting originally proposed by Dietterich [Dietterich et al, 1997] 
3
, each example e of
the target concept is a set {inst1,…instn} of descriptions called instances
4
. A positive example
e
+
 is an uncertain example: at least one instance (possibly several ones) satisfies the target
concept
5
. A negative example e
-
 is a generalized example: no instance satisfies the target
concept.
Although Dietterich does not actually present this setting in a logical framework we can
formalize it in the following way: consider that each instance of an example e  is an
interpretation, then e is the formula which models are these interpretations.
The framework is then similar to Learning from satisfiability: positive examples are uncertain,
negative ones are generalized. However in multiple-instance problems, the examples (and
hypotheses) are expressed in propositional (or attribute-value) representations. Such a
learning setting is useful when the learning task concerns multiple realities rather than
uncertainty. In the application that motivated multiple instance learning, the concept target
was the activity of a drug, each example was a molecule that could take various 3-
dimensional conformations, so each instance was one of these conformations. But during the
(chemical) experiments most of the conformations of a molecule appear. So in the learning
task, an active molecule is such that at least one conformation should be responsible of the
activity. However an inactive molecule corresponds to a generalized negative example: none
of the conformations should allow the activity. What happens here is that we do not really
deal with uncertain or generalized examples. Rather, we have a set of views of one, complete
example. The same situation occurs with multiple part problems, as defined by J.D. Zucker
[Zucker, 1998], [Zucker and Ganascia 1998], and in various attempts to propositionalize first
order learning problems in order to use variants of efficient propositional or attribute-value
learners [Alphonse and Rouveirol, 2000], [Sebag et al, 1996]. The basic idea is that an object
described using a first order representation, i.e. a relational description, can be reduced,
starting from some basic pattern, to multiple parts or multiple views corresponding to various
matches with a given pattern. As a consequence not only multiple instance or multiple part
learning and propositionalization do not deal with uncertainty, but multiple instances as single
instances can be uncertain. Note however that in this case, we should take care of
dependencies between assumptions.
6.2 Hirsh's settings
                                                 
3
 see also [Auer, 1997  ; Maron and Lozano-Perez, 1998]
5
 More precisely a boolean function i is associated with each example e: if e is positive ∃inst ∈ e such that f(inst)
= true, and  if e is negative ∀inst ∈ e, f(inst) = false.
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Extending the work of T. Mitchell [Mitchell, 1982], H. Hirsh introduced Version-Space
Merging [Hirsh, 1994] that represents each example e (positive or negative) as the set of
classifiers (i.e. hypotheses) that are compatible with e, (in the same sense used in the present
paper), each set being represented as a Version Space. The final Version Space is obtained by
intersecting all these Version Spaces. This work uses attribute-value representations of data
and hypotheses.
In its paper, H. Hirsh discuss various learning situations that Version Space merging allows to
deal with. For instance:
  Ambiguous data: Some attributes of the examples are not perfectly known (they
can take one value among a set of possibilities). The approach corresponds to our
pure uncertainty setting.
  Explanation-Based Learning: Here the apprentice is supposed to have a
background theory that, when applied to complete examples, provides
explanations of positive and negative examples, i.e. possibly transforms the
original example into one (or more) generalized examples. Whenever considering
all these generalized examples as correct, this setting corresponds to our
generalized examples setting. However, if the theory is incorrect but making the
weaker assumption that for each example at least one of the explanations is
correct, then each example results in a set of generalized examples from which at
least one is correct (e.g. a bird is light and migratory and we guess that either "bird
and light" or "bird and migratory"  is sufficient to conclude on the target concept).
This situation can be addressed in our learning from possibilities setting by
considering examples as both uncertain and generalized.
6.3 Uncertainty in propositional or attribute-value representations.
Uncertainty in propositional or attribute-value representations is often denoted as the "missing
values" problem. There are basically two approaches: either predicting the complete
description or taking into account the missing values when scoring the hypotheses. The
former approach supposes that one possible identity of the example is much more “probable”
than others and that such accurate prediction is possible. Then simple methods compute a
most probable value for each missing value, possibly using some simple Bayesian scheme,
where most sophisticated methods attempt to learn from examples to predict the missing
values [Liu et al, 1997]. In the later approach all possible identities are in some sense
considered, as the scoring function to optimize when searching a preferred solution is
weighted according to the probability distribution of the possible values for uncertain
attributes [Quinlan, 1993].The latter approach could not be used here since in our RNA
application all values were missing, so we had to use knowledge about the relations between
attribute-values. The former one, selecting only one possible identity was also not adequate
(as the most probable RNA structure generally is not the true one).
6.4 Abduction and Induction in Inductive Logic Programming.
Regarding first order representations, uncertainty has been addressed in works on abduction
and induction (see [Dimopoulos and Kakas, 1996; Kakas and Riguzzi, 1997]). The work of
Kakas and collaborators uses the so-called  “normal ILP learning settings” in which there is
only one observation, (or database), and examples are grounded predicates that have to be
derived from a hypothesis, facts and background knowledge. In such learning settings,
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knowledge about examples is considered as complete, and following the closed-world
assumption, when some grounded predicate is not in the database, it is considered as false. To
deal with uncertainty in I_ACL, some predicates are stated as “abducible”, i.e. useful
assumptions on which grounded occurrences of these predicates are true can be made in order
to derive the examples. Furthermore the scoring function of I-ACL gives a weaker weight to
hypotheses that need assumptions to derive examples. Note that, as there is one unique
observation and assumptions are made on a set of abducible predicates, the assumptions
concerning the examples are then mixed up, resulting in a complex combinatorial problem: If
we have n examples each of which requires k (abducible) grounded atoms, then there is 2
kn
sets of assumptions possibly constraining the hypotheses.  The same problem in our setting, in
which assumptions sets corresponding to various examples are independent, results in n2
k 
sets
of assumptions. This means that choices regarding sets of assumptions have to be made very
early during learning in the former setting, and this was not acceptable regarding our
biological application. Note, however, that abductive induction settings represent all the
examples in one unique world and so allow expressing more dependencies between
assumptions.
7 Conclusion
We have discussed in this paper logical learning settings dealing with incomplete examples.
We have identified two basic kind of incompleteness uncertainty and abstraction and we have
investigated a new general setting, namely learning from possibilities, in which each example
is associated to a set of possibilities. Each possibility corresponds to an alternative partial
description of the example that is stated as sufficient to classify the example with respect to
the target concept. This learning setting is shown to extend Learning from satisfiability, which
was proposed by L. De Raedt, by allowing more cases of incompleteness. As most learning
settings were previously shown to be particular cases of learning from satisfiability, these
settings also are particular cases of learning from possibilities. Though learning from
satisfiability was defined to learn Clausal theories,  we emphasized learning of DNF formulas
that are first order extensions of DNF hypotheses as investigated by propositional learners
However we have shown that algorithms that learn a DNF hypothesis from possibilities can
also learn a Clausal theory by inverting the example labels and negating the resulting DNF
hypothesis (and conversely algorithms that learn a Clausal theory can also learn a DNF
formula). A particular case of learning from possibilities is assumptions based learning that
copes with examples which uncertainty can be reduced when considering contextual
information outside of the proper description of the examples, i.e. knowledge about other
properties (i.e. predicates) or entities (i.e. constants). In particular we have exhibited various
practical properties of assumptions based learning of DNF+ formulas and discussed the use of
local and background knowledge both to deduce information about the examples and to help
reducing the uncertainty about examples. This was exemplified on our RNA structure
prediction problem that led to a first (and ad hoc) implementation of assumptions based
learning. A first research direction includes the investigation of using probabilities in
assumptions based learning and the design and implementation of efficient general learners
for both propositional and first order assumptions based learning. A second research direction
concerns assumptions based learning as a model for uncertain relational learning in
knowledge discovery and data mining. Further work also addresses investigation of
abstraction and uncertainty in the learning from entailment setting, and in learning in hybrid
knowledge representations formalisms [Rouveirol and Ventos, 2000]. Finally it would be
interesting to investigate the relation between Assumptions Based Learning (ABL) and its
deductive counterpart as found in Assumptions Based Truth Maintenance Systems (ATMS)
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[De Kleer, 1986]. Indeed in ABL a hypothesis is compatible with an uncertain example
provided that some assumptions concerning the truth-value of ground atoms are allowed, and,
as in ATMS, we have to deal in ABL with the various sets of assumption that support the
hypothesis. This suggests that incremental ABL learners could benefit from ATMS
techniques.
Appendix A - Proofs
In the proofs mentioned hereafter we will consider two Herbrand bases HB and HBs ⊆ HB
from which interpretations can be formed and an hypothesis H = ∃h1 ∨ ∃h2 …∨ ∃hn (a DNF
+
formula) formed from predicates (and possibly the set of constants) mentioned in HB.
A.1: Lemmas
Let us first consider following Lemmas, which will be used in the proofs below.
Lemma 1
Let j be a model of H, then an interpretation i greater than j is a model of H.
Proof : j is a model of H means that there is a substitution θ, grounding at least one hk, such
that all grounded atoms of hkθ belongs to jp. Then, all grounded atoms of hkθ belong to ip
 
as
ip⊇ jp.
Lemma 2
Let j be an interpretation that is not a model of H, then any interpretation i smaller than j is not
a model of H.
Lemma 3
Let  j be an interpretation built on HBs and tc(j) its associated clausal theory.
An interpretation j’ on HB is a model of tc(j) iff j’ is an extension of j on HB.
Proof :Let jp = {t1, ..,tm} and jn = {f1,…,fm} be the sets of respectively true and false grounded
atoms of HB in j. . Then tc(j) = {t1, ..,tm, ←f1,…,←fm}.
“⇒”Let  j’ be a model of tc(j).built on H. Then j’ is a model of each single grounded clause c
of tc(j). If c is a positive literal then necessarily j’p contains c. If c is a negative literal ←f,
then necessarily j’n contains  f. Thus j’ assigns to all atoms of j the truth-value they have in j,
and so j’is an extension of j.
“⇐” As j’ is an extension of j, then  j’p ⊇ jp and j’n ⊇ jn. As a consequence j’ is a model of
each single grounded clause of tc(j).
A.2: Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider a learning set under learning from satisfiability Es = Es
+
 ∪ ES
-
,.Following De
Raedt’s notations we will consider that any example of ES is written as  (c, class) where c is
the clausal theory that represents this example, and class is either positive (if e ∈  Es+)  or
negative (if e ∈ Es-). The function ρ maps any example (c, class) of Es onto an example ρ((c,
class))= (C, class) where C is a set of consistent clausal theories such that:
− ρ((c, positive)) =  ({ct(m1), …,ct(mk)}, positive) if we suppose that the clausal theory c
has k  Herbrand models {m1,…,mk}, ct(mi) and that ct(mi) is the clausal theory which
unique model is mi.
− ρ((c,negative))= ({c}, negative)
In consequence ρ maps Es onto a set EP = EP
+
 ∪ EP
-
. Then we have to prove that:
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Sol(ES) (under compatibleS) = Sol(EP) (under compatibleP),  where these solution sets are
defined  as :
Sol(ES) = {H | ∀(c, positive) ∈ ES
+
, H ∧ c |≠ !, and ∀(c, negative) ∈ ES
-
 H ∧ c |= !}
Sol(EP) = {H | ∀(C, positive)∈ EP
+
, H is compatibleP
+
 C, and ∀(C,negative) ∈ EP
-
, H is
compatibleP
- 
with
 
C}
The proof is as follows:
(1) Let (c, positive) be an example of Es
+
 and let ρ((c, positive)) =  ({ct(m1), …,ct(mk)},
positive) be the corresponding example of EP
+
, then :
H ∧ c |≠ ! ⇔ at least one Herbrand model of c is a model of H ⇔ ∃ mi ∈ {m1,…,mk} (the
Herbrand models of c) such that mi is a model of H ⇔ ∃ pi=ct(mi) ∈ {ct(m1), …,ct(mk)},
such that pi |= H  ⇔ H is compatibleP
+ 
with {ct(m1), …ct(mk)}
(2) Let (c, negative) an example of Es
-
 a n d  ρ((c, negative)) =  ({c}, negative) the
corresponding example of EP
-
 then
H ∧ c |= ! ⇔ ∃pi=c ∈ {c} such that pi ∧ H |= ! ⇔ H is compatibleP
-
 with {c}
A.3: Proof of Proposition 2
We provide a counter-example. Let us suppose that EP
+
 contains only the following positive
example ep =  {{a},{b}} and let EP
-
 =Ø. The concept space contains the clausal theories built
from the 0-ary predicates a and b. Then H is compatibleP
+
 ep means that ∃ pi ∈  {{a},{ b}}
such that pi |=  H , i.e.  (1) a |= H or b |= H.
Suppose a reduction ρ that maps EP = {(ep, positive)} onto ES containing the example {(C,
class)} where C is a consistent clausal theory and class is either positive or negative. Then a
solution H to the corresponding learning from satisfiability problem should either satisfy (2)
or (3) :
(2) C ∧ H |≠ !  if class = positive
(3) C ∧ H |=!  if  class = negative
Let I = {∅, {a}, {b}, {a, b}} be the set of all Herbrand interpretations. We denote as True the
formula whose set of models is I.
We first observe that class cannot be negative as H=true satisfies (1) but does not satisfy (3)
for any consistent clausal theory C.
Suppose now that class = positive. As neither H=¬a nor H=¬b satisfy (1), they must not
satisfy (2) and in consequence C |=a  and  C |=b. We conclude that C has one single model
that is {a,b}. We observe that for such a formula C, H = a ∧ b satisfies (2) but does not satisfy
(1) and this contradicts our initial assumption.
A.4: Proof of Proposition 5
• Proposition 5-a
Consider a partial model of e which is model of H, then, following Lemma 1, there exists
a maximal partial model of e which is a model of H. Conversely if each maximal partial
model of e is not a model of H then, following Lemma 2, no partial model of e is a model
of H.
• Proposition 5-b
Consider a model of e that is not a model of H, then following Lemma 2, there exists a
minimal partial model of e that is not a model of H. Conversely if each minimal partial
model of e is a model of H then, according to Lemma 1, each partial model of e is a model
of H.
The corollaries a) and b) are obvious.
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A.5: Proof of Proposition 6
⇒ : H is compatibleA
+ 
with e
 
 means that there is a partial model k of e built on HB and such
that ct(kp) ∧ ct(kn) ∧ e|≠ ! . Clearly k is also such that ct(kp) ∧ e|≠ !.
⇐ : Let us consider a model k of ct(jp)∧e built on HB. Then k can be written as m + n, where
m contains the atoms belonging to HB and n contains the atoms belonging to HBe-HB. Then
m = mp + mn, and as k is a model of ct(jp) , then mp ⊇ jp.
The interpretation m built on HB is so such that :
• m is a model of H (because m is greater than j and j is a model of H (see Lemma 1))
• ct(mp) ∧ ct(mn) ∧ e|≠ !   (because m is included in k which is a model of e).
A.6: Proof of Proposition 7
Let m be the least Herbrand model of e
-
, and pm be its projection on HB.
"⇐" Suppose pm is not a model of H , then H  is compatible with e
-
 if ct(pm)∧e
-
|≠HBe!.
According to Lemma 3 (“⇐”) m is a model of ct(pm). As m is also a model of e
-
 then H is
compatible with e
-
.
"⇒" Suppose that H is compatible with e
-
 thanks to an interpretation j
 
of HB. Then j is not a
model of H and ct(j) has a model j’ on HBe which is a model of e
-
. According to Lemma 3
(“⇒”),  j’ is an extension of j.
Consider now the following inclusions :
• pmp
 
⊆ j’p, because pmp ⊆ mp (as m is an extension of pm) and mp ⊆ j'p (as j' is greater than
m, like all models of e
-
)
• jp
 
⊆ j'p (as j' is an extension of j)
As j determines the truth-value of all atoms of HB, then j’p – jp is only made of true atoms of
HBe-HB. Suppose now that pm is a model of H on HB. In such a case as pmp ⊆ j’p,  then pmp
⊆ jp. Actually each atom of pmp is in HB so it cannot be in j’p - j’. Then, according to Lemma
1 j is a model of H, which contradicts the initial assumption that j is not a model of H. In
consequence pmp (actually pm) is not a model of H.
A.7 : Proof of proposition 8
Let e
+
 be a Horn clausal theory representing a positive extended uncertain example. H  is
compatible with e
+
 means that there is a model k of H  built on HB and such that tc(k) has a
model built on HBe that is a model of e
+
. According the laws of logics k is also a model of H
∨ h, so H ∨ h is compatible with e
+
.
Let now e
-
 be a Horn clausal theory representing a negative extended uncertain example. e
-
has a unique least Herbrand model m on HBe, and we will call pm its projection on HB.
As demonstrated in proposition 7, H is compatible with e
-
 entails that pm is not a model of H.
As h is compatible with e
-
, for the same reason pm is not a model of h.
So we observe that H ∨ h is compatible with e
-
 :
a) pm is not a model of H ∨ h (pm would then be a model of H ∨ h such that pm was a model
of H or pm was a model of h, which as previously been proved as false).
b) ct(pm) is a model of e
-
 : m 
 
is the extension of pm in HBe and therefore is a model of
ct(pm) built on HBe (see Lemma 3 ("⇐")).
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